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TRANSLATED BY JOSHUA FURNAL*
 Acharacteristic feature of modern thought is not the contestation of this or that dogma, of one religion or another, but rather the “overcoming” of 
faith and religion itself. One can see then how the reality of the church, which is 
the vital organism of religion and dogmas, leaps to the foreground and becomes 
the primary target of philosophy, which takes consciousness as its primary quality 
and self-consciousness as its effectual measure. It is not surprising then that—espe-
cially in the nineteenth century with the imposition of the modern principle—the 
church, its nature and function, becomes “problematic” for the point of reference 
and convergence of faith—its relation to reason and various dogmas—with the 
autonomous realization of the human being in the world (science) and in history 
(politics). It is no coincidence that in the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church 
defended its identity and mission with the concept of faith as “authority,” rather 
than “feeling.” If its “authority” falls away, then its unity and historical continuity 
will collapse along with the will of its founder. Here one can see how Newman and 
Kierkegaard both converge in an unexpected and almost complementary way. 
Just as there has been, for at least a half a century, a Kierkegaard-Renaissance, 
so also one can speak about a Newman-Renaissance. Although the former has been 
stimulated especially by Protestant theology—Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, 
and Emmanuel Hirsch, for better or for worse, have been the most prominent fig-
ures—the latter is predominantly Catholic.1 However, Newman’s conversion to the 
*  Joshua Furnal is Senior Researcher and Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology in the Fac-
ulty of Philsophy, Theology, and Religious Studies at Radboud University, Netherlands. Trans-
lator’s note: I would like to thank Dr. Ryan Marr, the former Director of the National Institute 
for Newman Studies, for generously providing me with a research fellowship and the necessary 
resources to complete this translation. I would also like to thank Dr. Elizabeth Huddleston and 
the rest of the editorial staff of the Newman Studies Journal for making it more widely available.
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Catholic Church, radical both intellectually and existentially, opened up the possibility 
for controversial yet still controvertible “hermeneutical endeavors” with Kierkegaard. 
Now, it must be said that the decisive motivation for Newman’s passage from 
Anglicanism to the Catholic Church was his search for the true church and his 
firm conviction about the identity between the ancient church and the Church of 
Rome.2 And yet, Newman was committed to resisting Modernism and its theology 
of immanence with innumerable followers ubique terrarium, regarding the relativity 
of dogmatic formulations. Today, with the anthropological turn in theology, the 
phenomenon of the church in the fourth century threatens to repeat itself—as 
Newman remembered—when the majority of bishops governing the church were 
Arian and St. Athanasius was left almost alone to combat and defend orthodoxy. 
It is from the preservation and “authentic” development of dogma, guaranteed 
uniquely in the Catholic Church, that Newman’s ecclesiology matured.3 Newman’s 
motto in this regard coincides with that of Kierkegaard: either/or [aut-aut].
If Athanasius could agree with Arius, St. Cyril with Nestorius, St. Dominic with 
the Albigenses, or St. Ignatius with Luther, then the two parties coalesce, in 
a certain assignable time, or by certain felicitously gradual approximations, 
or with dexterous limitations and concessions, who mutually think light 
darkness and darkness light. “Delenda est Carthago;” one or other must perish.4
Is there not a certain kind of pluralism that gets disseminated in post-conciliar theol-
ogy, which often resembles this picture? Does not the promotion of civil well-being, 
standing in solidarity with society on earth, the promotion of earthly peace, and 
1  During both the Kierkegaard and Newman Renaissance, especially in Germany, it was 
often suggested that this reception developed out of and was influenced by German Idealism, 
even though both Kierkegaard and Newman forcefully opposed it as a new form of Arianism.
2  “He joined the Catholic Church simply because he believed it, and it only, to be the 
Church of the Fathers; because he believed that there was a Church on earth till the end 
of time, and one only; and because, unless it was the Communion of Rome, and it only, 
there was none;—because, . . . all parties will agree that, of all existing systems, the present 
Communion of Rome is the nearest approximation in fact to the Church of the Fathers; 
. . . because, did St. Athanasius and St. Ambrose come suddenly to life . . . all will agree that 
these Fathers, with whatever differences of opinion, whatever protests if you will, would find 
themselves more at home with such men as St. Bernard or St. Ignatius of Loyola, or with the 
lonely priest in his lodgings, or the holy sisterhood of charity, or the unlettered crowd before 
the altar, than with the rulers or the members of any other religious community.”’ Newman, 
Diff i (London: Burns & Oates, 1888), 367–68. For more, see Newman, Dev (London: James 
Toovey, 1846), 138ff.
3  “Once the mind gradually opens up to the horizons of the Church, and comprehends its 
character and importance, his heart is consecrated wholly: the Church becomes the great love 
of his life.” Newman and Giovanni Velocci, Sermoni Liturgici (Fossano: Esperienze, 1971), 10.
4  Newman, Diff i, 113.
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acquiring indistinct goods, in effect subordinate theology, and its message of salva-
tion, to that of sociology and economics? Does it not place the established church 
in service of the “established order?”5 This supposed servitude fundamentally sub-
ordinates the church to the state: the state declares this confession as the religion of 
the state and commits to protect it and to pay the stipends of its ministers—as long 
as it maintains the right of appointment and governance. The Oxford Movement 
of 1833 arose to resist the debasement of the church, which was also prevalent in 
England.6 “The Church should have absolute power over her faith, worship, and 
teaching,” and this is to be found only in the Catholic Church (Diff i, 195).
This is also the case for Kierkegaard, who argued that the “State Church” 
represents the larceny and mystification that inflicted incalculable damage upon 
Christianity by making it dependent upon the advantages of the kingdoms of this 
world. With this fusion of religion and politics, Protestantism produced absurdities 
like the notion of “State Churches, People’s Churches, or Christian countries.”7 In 
this way, through the mediation of the world, politics, the economy, as well as culture 
and science, the Christianity found in the New Testament was reduced in modern 
thought (thanks especially to Hegel) to the interests of this world: “You asses!”8
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE AGREEMENT IN VARIOUS APPROACHES
The first impression about the problem of the church in the approach of 
Newman and Kierkegaard is that, for the former, the church remains central and 
constitutes the core and heart of determining the foundation of the truth that 
saves; whereas for the latter, the church—if it is not wholly rejected—is left on the 
periphery of the intentional circle of spirit whose center is concerned with—ac-
cording to the impulse of modern thought—freedom as self-determination and 
the self-constitution of the “I.” However, for Kierkegaard, this impulse takes on an 
entirely new and original form as “the single individual before God,” which gets 
realized in the imitation of Christ, the God-Man, and in the retrieval of the faith 
of the early church, of martyrs and confessors, as it is for Newman.
5  Both Newman and Kierkegaard use a term that shares the same root. Newman uses “Es-
tablishment,” and Kierkegaard uses “Established Church” [Bestaaende].
6  Newman investigates the classic text of such a view by Bishop Warburton, entitled “The 
Alliance of Church and State,” Diff i, 189ff), and Newman cites many examples from that work.
7  Søren Kierkegaard, Papirer 1854, XI1 A 190 / KJN NB 30:19a. —Translator’s note: In 
the body of the text above, I have deferred to Fabro’s rendering of the original Danish text. 
Fabro cites from Søren Kierkegaard and Niels Thulstrup, Papirer (København: Gyldendal, 
1968). Following Fabro’s citation, I have included the corresponding system of reference 
in Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, ed. Bruce H. Kirmmse and Niels 
Jørgen Cappelørn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Henceforth, KJN.
8  Papirer 1854, XI1 A 248 / KJN NB 30:67.
129cornelio fabro
The combination of Kierkegaard and Newman has been achieved for a long 
time now in the theological historiography. For example, consider the excellent 
translators and scholars of Kierkegaard and Newman such as Theodor Haecker,9 
followed by Fr. Erich Przywara.10 Moreover, this combination already has been 
indicated by liberal writers like Georg Brandes, a friend of Nietzsche,11 and Har-
ald Høffding.12 The trajectory initiated by Haecker was followed substantially by 
9  Theodor Haecker, Opuscula: Ein Sammelband (München: Hegner, 1949), 211. Also see, 
Theodor Haecker, Der Begriff der Wahrheit bei Søren Kierkegaard (Innsbruck: Verlag, 1932). 
For Haecker, Kierkegaard’s merit was revealed in the structure of subjectivity, its crooked-
ness [Schiefheit] in “not having conceived the correlation between objective and subjective 
truth.” As an indispensable complement to this view, one must consider Newman, “whose 
concept of truth contains the comprehension of an objective truth.” Josef Brechtken, Kierke-
gaard-Newman: Wahrheit und Existenzmitteilung (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1970), 5–6, cf. 
145n. Haecker’s position is also mentioned and discussed in Walter Ruttenbeck, Sören Kierke-
gaard: Der christliche Denker und sein Werk (Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1929), 2, esp. 322–25.
10  Erich Przywara, “Kierkegaard—Newman,” Newman Studien 1 (1948): 77–101. Przywara 
only mentions in passing the conception of the church in Kierkegaard and Newman (92ff), 
but seems to affirm that, whereas for Newman, the visible authority of the church was de-
cisive, Kierkegaard remained faithful to the Lutheran critique of church authority on the 
basis of interiority. Otto Karrer has collected all the important texts by Newman regarding 
the church in J. H. Newman, Die Kirche, 2 vols. (Köln: Einsiedeln, 1945–1946).
11  “Through him [Kierkegaard], Danish intellectual life was pushed to that extreme point 
where a leap must be made, either a leap down into the dark abyss of Catholicism, or over 
to the headland from which freedom beckons.” Georg Brandes, Kierkegaard Und Andere Skan-
dinavische Persönlichkeiten (Dresden: Reißner, 1924), 431. This essay from Brandes was pub-
lished originally in 1877. The Swedish theologian Waldemar Rudin immediately replicated 
the negative views of Brandes, but criticized him for, among other things, completely ignor-
ing an important book like The Sickness unto Death. For more, see Waldemar Rudin and Sören 
Kierkegaard, Sören Kierkegaards Person Och Författarskap (Stockholm: Nilsson, 1880), 194.
12  “The attack that Kierkegaard directs against established Christendom was conducted 
from a similar perspective as that of John Henry Newman some years earlier (1833–1843) 
who lashed out against the Establishment of the English Church and who later converted 
to the Catholic Church. . . . When Kierkegaard often claims that the great decline and de-
generation is in the Protestant Church but not in the Catholic Church, he still remains in 
agreement with Newman whom he certainly would not have known. With this observation, it 
should not be said that Kierkegaard, if he had lived longer, he would have followed the same 
path as Newman.” Harald Høffding, Danske Filosofer (København: Univ. Udvalget, 1909), 
170ff. Høffding cites one of Newman’s students as his source: Richard H. Hutton, Cardinal 
Newman (London: Methuen, 1891) who mentions that the declarations in the discourses 
of 1843 about the Christian ideal and the independence of the church from the state have 
an explicitly Catholic inspiration (114ff). Even Newman accused himself of this: “Obviously 
Newman was very restive under the political conditions of the Establishment, not only be-
cause he wanted to obtain a greater independence for the Church than the political alliance 
with the State admitted, but also because he resented the comfort, the ease, the sleek seren-
ity, the worldly consideration and influence over worldly people, to which the alliance with 
the State had brought our Anglican clergy. He believed that no Church which was full of the 
spirit of Christ could possibly be on such good terms with the spirit of the world” (115–16). 
A perspective that resembles Kierkegaard’s view of the Danish Church!
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Catholics and Protestants alike, and it showed that Kierkegaard’s radical method 
rested upon two pillars: 1) the separation, or rather the distinction between 
knowing and acting (freedom), and 2) the incompatibility between the world 
and the religious spirit. As Werner Becker notes, “From this perspective there no 
longer remains any interpretive key [des Schlüssels] for the reality of creation, for 
the principle of analogy,” which is Newman’s fundamental position.13 
Since 1925, even Romano Guardini, who was so influential for other German 
Catholics, saw the relation between Newman and Kierkegaard (with respect to the 
problem of the church) in opposed and negative terms. Guardini’s assumption 
was that Kierkegaard’s conception of “interiority” contrasted with the need for the 
“community” [Gemeinschaft] of the church. However, I do not find the motivations 
animating these negative interpretive approaches convincing at all. 
For example, consider how Erik Peterson notes that Kierkegaard’s position 
is advanced as a “dialectician,” rather than a dogmatic theologian. If dogma and 
church belong together, Kierkegaard (in his own view!) does not find this to be 
the case when he is bound by a pattern of dialectical thought without access to 
dogma or to the church.14 On the other hand, Johannes Hohlenberg claims that 
Kierkegaard recognized dogma and thus a place for the “single individual” inside 
the church when he prefers the authentic Christian Church over the secularized 
Danish State Church (Grundtvig, Rudelbach, Mynster, Martensen) of his own day.15 
For this reason, other interpreters have insisted on the need for a positive 
and constructive approach to Kierkegaard and Newman at this important juncture 
regarding the reality of the church for determining the truth that saves, for the 
appropriation of dogma, and the exercise of faith according to New Testament 
Christianity.16 To me it seems that both Newman and Kierkegaard move decisively 
13  Werner Becker, “Der Überschritt Von Kierkegaard Zu Newman in Der Lebensentscheidung 
Theodors Haeckers,” Newman Studien 1 (1948): 255, 251–70. Kierkegaard’s struggle against the 
“system” (of reason) and the ascent of the “I” toward the decision of faith or the (existential) 
position of “truth as subjectivity” is the aim of the thesis by Jann Holl, Kierkegaards Konzeption 
des Selbst: eine Untersuchung über die Voraussetzungen und Formen seines Denkens (Meishenheim am 
Glan: A. Hain, 1972). It seems that the author is unaware of Josef Brechtken’s work. 
14  Erik Peterson, “Was ist Theologie?,” in Theologische Traktate (München: Kösel-Verlag, 
1950), 16–17.
15  Johannes Hohlenberg, Sören Kierkegaard, German translation (Basel: Schwalbe, 1949), 401ff.
16  For an analysis of the question prior to 1961, see the dissertation by Karl Theodor Kehr-
bach, Sören Kierkegaard und das Problem der Kirche (Erlangen 1961). An English-speaking critic 
and translator of Kierkegaard frames the divergence between Newman and Kierkegaard on 
the problem of the church in this way: “Newman spent a good part of his life in seeking an 
answer to the right church. Had he posed the question subjectively, he would have asked 
instead how his subjectivity should be constituted, in order that the fellowship of those 
like-minded with him might constitute the true church. And, in view of the circumstance 
that no individual is finished, he would have been compelled to postulate that no individual 
is finished, he would have been compelled to postulate the true and ideal church as an invis-
ible and spiritual order. The fixation of the religious life about a formula or an institution as 
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in this second direction toward a real and fundamental agreement, even if various 
aspects can appear to be notably different on the surface.
THE ALTERNATIVE OF SALVATION IN NEWMAN: 
EITHER THE CATHOLIC CHURCH OR ATHEISM
The problem of the church has accompanied Newman on his unique spiri-
tual journey from beginning to end, which concluded with his Letter to the Duke of 
Norfolk in defense of the Roman Church and papal infallibility against the attacks 
of Lord Gladstone. The five chapters of his Apologia can be read as five stops on this 
exceptional itinerary. One should not read it as a passive acceptance of the Catholic 
reality and the Catholic Church as it is presented in the nineteenth century. Instead, 
it represents more of a call from and free response to a dynamic catholicity that is 
active and operative at every level of the ecclesial community: from the hierarchy 
all the way to the simple faithful, for the salvation of the modern person.
The beginning of this arduous and conflict-ridden journey is marked by 
Newman in the autumn of 1816, at fifteen years of age, and it can be seen as his 
first conversion after his infancy and adolescence passed by with indifference.
When I was fifteen, (in the autumn of 1816), a great change of thought took 
place in me. I fell under the influences of a definite Creed, and received 
into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God’s mercy, have 
never been effaced or obscured.17 
The impetus and occasion came from his friend and teacher Walter Mayers who 
advised him to read a work by William Romaine about the doctrine of final perse-
verance: the effect was to consider oneself as a member of the predestined elect and 
to neglect everyone else, but this is also where he received his phrase for describing 
the religious relationship—”Myself and my Creator.” Newman quickly refused pre-
destination, which he thought was detestable. However, this encounter gave him the 
first profound quake or signal of the absolute subjectivity of conscience and God’s 
absolute objectivity—the radical quality of the religious that he will carry forward 
with heroic faithfulness in the formulation of his drastic either/or, which profoundly 
unites his “logic” of the religious act to Kierkegaard’s view of faith. 
a final resting-place that decides once and for all the issues of life is an illegitimate objectivity 
which the subjective thinker uses his dialectic to avoid.” David F. Swenson, Something about 
Kierkegaard, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1945), 131. For more on this interpreta-
tion, see also Walter Hammel, “Die ‘natürliche Religion’ bei Newman und die ‘Religiosität 
A’ bei Kierkegaard,” Newman-Studien 2 (1954): 45ff. One of the last declarations by Kierkeg-
aard in 1855, as we shall see, seems to be made decisively along this line. 
17  Newman, Apo, 4.
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In other words, there is solidarity or an internal relation of belonging between 
theism and Catholicism. Thus, either atheism or Catholicism, that one must be 
either an atheist and unbeliever or a Roman Catholic is the alternative [aut-aut] 
that Newman presented in the account of his conversion to the Roman Church in 
1845. In short, what is discovered in Newman is a fundamental retrieval of Blaise 
Pascal’s wager,18 which represents a conclusion to the intricate and intensive ac-
tivity of theological reflection in “fear and trembling” as Kierkegaard would say.
CONNECTING THEISM AND ROMAN CATHOLICISM
I think that this is a fundamental point for any serious approach to the 
problem of faith, especially in our time when the themes of theological pluralism 
and ecumenism are trending. The existential alternative manifests in two ways: 
1) as the affirmation of God’s existence, and 2) the real existential identity of the 
profession of theism along with Roman Catholic Christianity. Together, these 
two moments represent the result of an intense and complex interior activity 
brought to the theological inquiry about the problem of the church, which will 
be addressed in the next section. However, I mention it now because it allows us 
to catch a glimpse of the profound dynamism of Newman’s spirit and the incom-
parable originality of his thought.
a) The alternative: God’s existence and the unity of the spiritual life. And thus again 
I was led on to examine more attentively what I doubt not was in my thoughts 
long before, viz. the concatenation of argument by which the mind ascends 
from its first to its final religious idea; and I came to the conclusion that 
there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, 
and that a perfectly consistent mind, under those circumstances in which 
it finds itself here below, must embrace either the one or the other. And I 
hold this still: I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am 
asked why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, 
for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact I 
18  The point gets developed with exceptional vigor in Pascal’s Pensées, ed. (Paris: Nel-
son, 1917), 547–49, ed. Brunschvicg minor, 571f. Kierkegaard’s encounter with Pascal is 
common knowledge by now. Beyond the vast investigation by Denzil G. M. Patrick, Pascal 
and Kierkegaard, 2 vols. (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947). The first volume is dedicated to 
Pascal, and the second to Kierkegaard. See also, Johannes Hessen, Religionsphilosophie, Bd. 
2 (Freiburg: Chamier, 1948), 295; Michael Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik, Bd. 1 (München: 
Hueber, 1940), 288; Adolf Kolping, Fundamentaltheologie, Bd. 1 (Münster: Regensberg, 1967), 
288; Kierkegaard’s three stages are compared to Pascal’s three orders in Pierre Mesnard, Le 
vrai visage de Kierkegaard (Paris: Heinz, 1948), 186; Simon Geiger, Der Institutionsbegriff in der 
katholischen Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart (Freiburg: Herder, 1926), 77 & 103ff.
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am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as 
a Personal, All-seeing and All-judging Being in my conscience (Apo, 198).
b) The connection and probing force of probability. Moreover, I found a corrobo-
ration of the fact of the logical connexion [sic] of Theism and Catholicism 
in a consideration parallel to that which I had adopted on the subject of 
development of doctrine. The fact of the operation from first to last of that 
principle of development in the truths of Revelation, is an argument in 
favour of the identity of Roman and Primitive Christianity; but as there is a 
law which acts upon the subject-matter of dogmatic theology, so is there a 
law in the matter of religious faith (Apo, 199).
In the first chapter of his Apologia, Newman had defended the claim that certainty 
is the consequence (willed and imposed by God) of the overall strength of determi-
nate reasons that, taken one by one, only amount to probability and he confesses: 
That I believed in a God on a ground of probability, that I believed in Chris-
tianity on a probability, and that I believed in Catholicism on a probability, 
and that these three grounds of probability, distinct from each other of 
course in subject matter, were still all of them one and the same in nature of 
proof, as being probabilities—probabilities of a special kind, a cumulative, 
a transcendent probability, but still probability; inasmuch as He who made 
us has so willed, that in mathematics indeed we should arrive at certitude by 
rigorous demonstration, but in religious inquiry we should arrive at certitude 
by accumulated probabilities;—He has willed, I say, that we should so act, 
and, as willing it, He co-operates with us in our acting, and thereby enables 
us to do that which He wills us to do, and carries us on, if our will does but 
co-operate with His, to a certitude which rises higher than the logical force 
of our conclusions (Apo, 199–200). 
c) The Conclusion. And thus I came to see clearly, and to have a satisfaction in 
seeing, that, in being led on into the Church of Rome, I was not proceeding 
on any secondary or isolated grounds of reason, or by controversial points in 
detail, but was protected and justified, even in the use of those secondary or 
particular arguments, by a great and broad principle. But, let it be observed, 
that I am stating a matter of fact, not defending it; and if any Catholic says in 
consequence that I have been converted in a wrong way, I cannot help that now.19 
19  Newman, Apo, 200, trans. This is also the lesson of the ancient church: “either to be a 
Catholic or an infidel” in Diff, 393. Another form of the argument “there is no alternative be-
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Newman presents an arduous and frank account that obtains coherence from the 
rhythm of truth within the whole of reason, rather than from particular reasons. In 
itself, the argument is not entirely new, but it captures the heart of our existential 
situation before Christianity, which elicited both sensational and indignant results 
as can be seen from note II that was written during December 1880, which was 
added by Newman to the new edition of Grammar of Assent.20 The accusation was: 
“Cardinal Newman has confined his defense of his own creed to the proposition that 
it is the only possible alternative to Atheism” (GA, 495). If the adversary—respond-
ed Newman—intends to insist on the accusation, it is a sign that he has not read 
Newman’s published defense of his creed in the Essay on Development of Doctrine, 
Theological Tracts, A Letter to Dr. Pusey, A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk—works that were 
all written in defense of the Catholic faith but never mentioned the word “athe-
ism.” Evidently, Newman reminded his Anglican readers (and opponents) that 
the substance of that alternative is allegedly found in the Analogy of Joseph Butler: 
That there is no consistent standing or logical medium between the acceptance 
of the Gospel and the denial of a Moral Governor, for the same difficulties 
can be brought against both beliefs, and if they are fatal as against Christi-
anity, they are fatal against natural religion, should we not have understood 
what was meant? (496).
However, Butler’s aim with this argument from analogy is mainly negative. Yet an 
argument that tries to prove something must be positive. Butler does not demon-
strate that Christianity is true with his famous argument, but rather he removes 
the main obstacles to accepting the evidence of Christianity. But Newman insists 
that in his writings, far from confining himself to the argument of analogy, he 
used independent and positive arguments. He follows an important citation from 
his Sermon on Mysteries: 
If I must submit my reason to mysteries, it is not much matter whether it is 
a mystery more or a mystery less; the main difficulty is to believe at all; the 
main difficulty for an inquirer is firmly to hold that there is a living God, in 
tween Catholicism and skepticism” is that “either the Catholic Religion is verily and indeed the 
coming in of the unseen world into this, or that there is nothing positive, nothing dogmatic, 
nothing real, in any of our notions as to whence we come and whither we are going. Unlearn 
Catholicism, and you open the way to your becoming Protestant, Unitarian, Deist, Pantheist, 
Skeptic, in a dreadful, but inevitable succession.” Mix, 282, trans. For more, see Characteristics 
from the Writings of John Henry Newman, ed. W. S. Lilly (London: Kegan Paul, 1885), 338 ff. 
20  In the London edition (Longmans, Green, and Co., 1913), 485ff. For Newman the oc-
togenarian, this note contains his “last words” of clarification about the fundamental thesis 
of Grammar of Assent (499).
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spite of the darkness which surrounds Him, the Creator, Witness, and Judge 
of men. When once the mind is broken in, as it must be, to the belief of 
a Power above it, when once it understands that it is not itself the grounds 
and motives; but I say that, when once it believes in God, the great obstacle 
to faith has been taken away, a proud, self-sufficient spirit, etc. (GA, 498).
This is the existential aspect of Newman’s argument. However, this time—and it 
seems to me to be the first time—Newman flips Butler’s argument from negative 
to positive, and he applies it as a law of development for dogma through which 
revealed truth is passed:
And then I reflected that a law implied a law-giver, and that so orderly and 
majestic a growth of doctrine in the Catholic church, contrasted with the 
deadness and helplessness, or the vague changes and contradictions in the 
teaching of other religious bodies, argued a spiritual Presence in Rome, 
which was nowhere else, and which constituted a presumption that Rome 
was right; if the doctrine of the Eucharist was not from heaven, why should 
the doctrine of Original Sin be? If the Athanasian Creed was from heaven, 
why not the Creed of Pope Pius?21
This, he observes, is an analogical use that can be differentiated from and goes 
beyond the use that Butler makes of it. Therefore, when he recognized its force in 
the development of doctrine, he applied it to the evidence for religion and in this 
sense, he concluded with what he said in Apologia: “There is no medium in true phi-
losophy—to a perfectly consistent mind —between Atheism and Catholicity” (498).
For Newman, the trouble is that the vast majority of people are not coherent 
in their religious convictions, and they do not worry about grounding their own 
beliefs; they pick up [paghi] what they find in their own environment. Here New-
man touches upon the most original aspect of his theory with unmatched clarity 
and vigor: there is a certain ethical character, one and the same, a system of first 
principles, of feelings and tastes, a way of seeing the question and of argumentation, 
that is an investigative organ formally and normally, naturally and divinely, given to 
us to grasp religious truth. It must lead our minds along an infallible succession 
from the refusal of atheism to theism, and from theism to Christianity, and from 
Christianity to evangelical religion, and from this to Catholicism. And likewise, when 
a Catholic finds this theoretical system wanting, it is not a surprise if he abandons 
the Catholic church, and as a result, wants to rid himself of religion altogether. 
This is the dynamic of the existential resolution of a religious conscience. And he 
adds an observation about the proper context of that incriminating alternative: 
21  Newman, GA, 498, trans. An allusion to the Credo of Pius IV in the Council of Trent.
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I have said of course there was a descending as well as an ascending course 
of inquiry and of faith. However, speaking in my Apologia Evidences, and, 
following the lead of what I have said there about doctrinal development, I 
have mainly in view the ascending scale, not the descending. I have meant 
to say, “I am a Catholic, for the reason that I am not an Atheist’. This makes 
the misinterpretation of my words which I am exposing the more striking, 
for it paraphrases me into a threat and nothing else, viz. ‘If you are not a 
Catholic, you must be an Atheist, and will go to hell’” (GA, 499).
Mr. Lilly comes to Newman’s defense and shows that the alternative is taken in its 
positive sense, not its negative one, and in this way, whoever denies revealed religion 
must also deny natural revelation. Newman follows his own citation from a lecture 
that preceded the Apologia by many years, in which he maintains that if someone
“let him really and truly, and not in words only, or by inherited profession, 
or in the conclusions of reason, but by a direct apprehension be a Monothe-
ist,” (that is, with what in the foregoing Essay I have called a “real assent” as 
following upon “Inference,” and acting as a fresh start), “and he is already 
three-fourths of the way towards Catholicism” (GA, 500).
 He reports at the end that Mr. Lilly’s reply (to the accusation) is documented by 
the main works “of his friend and venerable Cardinal” and is condensed as follows: 
Catholicism, which he regards as the sole form of Christianity historically or 
philosophically tenable, is for him the only possible complement of natural 
religion . . . Cardinal Newman’s main defence—not his sole defence—of his 
creed amounts, then, to this: that religion is an integral part of our nature, 
and that Catholicism alone adequately fulfils the expectation of a revelation 
which natural religion raises. This may be a good or a bad defence; but, 
whether good or bad, it is very different from the nude proposition “that 
Catholicism is the only possible alternative to atheism.”22
The strength of the entire argument remains in the fact—Lilly observes—that for 
Newman, God’s existence is primarily a conviction that derives from the testimo-
ny of conscience, in an irresistible way, it is the great truth whereby the whole of 
one’s being is fulfilled.23 This is the fundamental point under a speculative aspect.
22  Newman, GA, 501, trans. 
23  Here Lilly cites the text from Apologia mentioned above (from the 1865 edition, 241, ed. 
M. Ward, 162: it is one of Newman’s finest passages). 
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In this way, Newman found the true church from within the development 
of the life of the church. In his Apologia, Newman enunciates three fundamen-
tal principles:24 1) The first was the principle of dogma (against liberalism with 
atheistic tendencies) that made him say: “As well can there be filial love without 
the fact of a father, as devotion without the fact of a Supreme Being. What I held 
in 1816, I held in 1833, and I hold in 1864. Please God, I shall hold it to the end” 
(Apo, 49). 2) “Secondly, I was confident in the truth of a certain definite teaching, 
based upon this foundation of dogma; viz. that there was a visible Church, with 
sacraments and rites which are the channels of invisible grace” (Apo, 49). In this 
way, Newman admits that he was assisted by the writings of Anglican theologians 
like Laud, Bramhall, Stillingfleet, and Butler, the study of the church fathers, 
and the Prayer Book.25 3) The third point can be expressed with the phrase that 
Kierkegaard used to define anxiety: “an antipathic sympathy and an sympathetic 
antipathy”26 for the Church of Rome where, according to the Protestant tradition, 
the “Pope was the Antichrist”—but Newman had learned from his friend Froude 
to admire the great pontiffs of the Middle Ages and he considered the Council of 
Trent “as the decisive turn in the history of Christian Rome.” His conversion was 
then the continuous process of a continuous faithfulness in the continuous action 
of grace. The only difficulty was the church as an “institution”: “My judgment was 
against her, when viewed as an institution, as truly as it ever had been” (Apo, 54). 
Even as a convert, this aspect made Newman’s outspoken spirit suffer greatly and 
frequently surfaced in firm and explicit lamentations, as is often noted.
THE ALTERNATIVE OF SALVATION IN KIERKEGAARD: 
EITHER THE CHURCH MILITANT OR PAGANISM
Newman’s approach is different from, and, for this reason, it can appear as op-
posed to Kierkegaard’s position with respect to the church. Kierkegaard’s curriculum, 
his dialectic, and his point of arrival seem to diverge from Newman’s. Certainly, they 
24  Newman, Apo, 32–54, trans.
25  This reference to the Divines represents one of the touchpoints on Newman’s journey: 
in addition to Bramhall’s works, “Thorndike, Barrow on the Unity of the Church, and Les-
lie’s Dialogues on Romanism” are mentioned. Also “Hooker’s great work: or Bull’s Defensio 
and Harmonia, or Pearson’s Vindiciae, or Jackson on the Creed,” together with other de-
votional writers like Laud, Bingham, Waterland, Wall, and Palmer and bishops like Taylor, 
Wilson, and Horne. Cf. Loss and Gain, ix (London 1886), 274, 337, 365. The most complete 
list of Divines is found in Lecture 1 (part 1) of Diff (London 1888) tome 1, 2ff, cf. also p. 378 
where they are mentioned as Doctors of the VM.
26  Søren Kierkegaard, Reidar Thomte, and Albert Anderson, The Concept of Anxiety: A Sim-
ple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin (Princeton: Princ-
eton University Press, 1980), 42.
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both came from profoundly different cultural environments and ecclesial situations. 
The Anglican Church had not yet been corrupted by idealist philosophy, like the 
Danish Church, and this makes Newman’s task easier than Kierkegaard’s. Indeed, 
the great English convert had a fundamental grasp of Catholicism—also thanks to 
his trip to Italy when he was younger—and he had studied Catholic doctrine closely. 
Yet, Kierkegaard was completely entrenched in resistance to modern thought and 
“established Christendom,” which he held responsible for the radical loss of New 
Testament Christianity. It must be noted that the intensity of Kierkegaard’s struggle 
brought about an early death for him at 42 years of age when Newman was only at 
midlife and not yet a convert. Yet, it was precisely Kierkegaard’s polemic against the 
state church, which was accepted and defended in Protestantism by both Anglicans 
and Lutherans, that would push some of the best readers of Kierkegaard during this 
century, but also in later decades, to enter the Church of Rome (Theodor Haecker, 
Erik Peterson, Alexander Dru, etc.).
However, the greatest obstacle for an encounter between Newman and Kierke-
gaard on the doctrine of the church seems to be precisely their basic stance toward 
it. In fact, Newman always involved his own curriculum within the church to be able 
to return to it through his conversion to the “ancient Mother”; whereas Kierkegaard 
instead seems to detach himself gradually from every kind of church, or the historical 
church as such, judging the concept itself of “church” to be an institution that is 
contrary to New Testament Christianity.27 It is in this sense that Kierkegaard’s cele-
brated theory of “the single individual before God” often gets interpreted by many 
readers. We can observe immediately—without diminishing the difficulty that such 
a theory effectively would present to constituting a traditional ecclesiology—that 
similarly Newman himself had discovered this feature of the Christian life, which gets 
evoked by the emblematic phrase of his conversion: solus cum solo. This also reveals 
the significance behind Newman’s overcoming of the via media, which corresponds to 
Kierkegaard’s doctrine of “the single individual” and “the extraordinary Christian.”28
27  It has been observed that “Except for the final few months, Kierkegaard went regularly 
to church, himself preached in churches on occasion, and as a humble suppliant received 
the Sacrament of the Altar.” Howard A. Johnson, “Kierkegaard and the Church,” Kierkeg-
aardiana VIII (1971): 65, 64–79. The author is not aware of Kehrbach’s thesis, nor does he 
mention the affinity between Kierkegaard and Newman, but he does affirm a link with St. 
Thomas: “Like St. Thomas Aquinas (or any other theologian until recent times), he is so 
living in the sacramental, ecclesiological reality that it rarely becomes a topic for special 
study. All of the ‘equipment,’ the whole of the ‘Christian inventory,’ he could safely presup-
pose—bell, book, and candle” (66).
28  One can admit that in the Papirer of the later Kierkegaard, he considers both Protestant-
ism and historical Catholicism as two aberrant positions from New Testament Christianity. 
For more see, Wilhelm Kütemeyer, Der einzelne und die kirche: über Luther und den protestantis-
mus (Berlin: K. Wolff, 1934), 12ff. However, regarding our topic, Kierkegaard fundamentally 
criticized the two principles of sola Scriptura and sola Fides and defended the Letter of St. James 
against Luther. For more, see Papirer 1850, X3 A 516 / KJN NB 21:74. 
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Regarding the existential and strongly polemical aspect, which is precisely 
Kierkegaard’s method, one must proceed with great caution and distrust categorical 
formulations by keeping in mind—also his precise meaning—the fundamental prin-
ciple of his reflection in the ethico-religious sphere that “the truth is subjectivity.”29 
This affirmation has nothing to do with the modern (and modernist) principle 
of gnoseological subjectivity that brought about the elimination of metaphysical 
transcendence and the absolute value of the historical event of Christianity. This 
Kierkegaardian principle simply says that to be a Christian, it is not enough to accept 
a creed from a church, in which one is baptized and inscribed as a member. To be 
saved, one needs to embody this faith in everyday life because Christianity is not a 
doctrine but a communication of existence. Therefore, one must detach oneself from the 
world and from any collusion with the aspirations of worldly privilege: career, money, 
pleasure, honors, etc. This is what makes concrete the imitation of the model, which is 
Jesus Christ. By accepting this principle, the church also discovers its foundation for 
Kierkegaard, and this explains his polemic against the situation of the state church. 
The principle of subjectivity (the priority of the “I,” the single individual) 
appears in the foreground and it is put in close relationship in a Catholic sense 
to affirm the priority of the church:
That subjectivity which I think must be central above all for the Church—
since one can make the same objection against every new norm that one 
wants to place above the Church, an objection that is rightly made about the 
Bible—one finds is already adumbrated in the fact that the most objective 
moment in the profession of faith begins like this: ‘I believe’.30
But the young Kierkegaard immediately concludes from the problem of the rela-
tion between reason and faith, between Christianity and philosophy, that they can 
never be reconciled.31 The most significant and surprising text comes from 1835: 
Is the Church authorized to write a Bible at a particular moment? [and 
Kierkegaard asks himself] Have the apostolic Church and the Bible pre-
figured the Christian Church and its doctrine? [And he responds] No, it is 
no prefiguration (a supposition that could lead to the other supposition of 
inspiration; just as inspiration logically brings us to this supposition); but it 
29  This is the thesis of Johannes Climacus in Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and 
Edna H. Hong, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, vol. 1, Kierkegaard’s 
Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 189ff.
30  Papirer 1835, I A 56 / KJN Papir 91. In the two following passages (I A 57 & 59 / Papir 89 
& 90) Kierkegaard envisages the necessity of a propaedeutic science of the Apostles Creed 
to use within the church.
31  Papirer 1835, I A 94 and 99 / KJN AA 13:13 and AA 13:18.
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[the apostolic Church] is nothing but the first stage of development and the 
Bible is our first telegraphic notification. [And returning to the first question 
the young theologian replies] Does the Bible constitute the Church? No, the 
Church constitutes the Bible, and it is demonstrated also by the fact that it 
has been written for Christians. [The text continues with a dig [frecciata] at 
the Protestant view that] their image of the Bible hovers over the Church as 
the sacred tomb of Mohammed hovers over four magnets.32
Here we can already see emerging Kierkegaard’s critique of the Protestant prin-
ciple of Sola scriptura and the recognition of the Catholic Tridentine thesis as the 
existential and theological prius in the sense of needing a custodian, guarantor, 
and interpreter of the Bible and Tradition. For this reason, in contrast with the 
young Newman who declared himself to be an angry anti-Catholic, the young 
Kierkegaard reveals an open sympathy for the Catholic Church.
For Kierkegaard, the need for the church is developed and asserted in the 
Christian doctrines of original sin, “the superabundance of good works,” and 
“from the inexpressible need for prayer, which the unhappy dead seek through 
the living (the church’s dogma of the Mass for the dead).”33 How far are we from 
Luther’s polemic against the Catholic Church?
Kierkegaard’s stance toward the Catholic Church (separated from the state) 
and his resistance to the fusion and subordination of the church to the state in 
Protestantism becomes clearer through the years. In fact, politically Kierkegaard 
was a convinced conservative. When he refers the church, he contrasts it with the 
state and every other worldly institution that “tends toward self-preservation,” 
whereas the church must keep itself in becoming. There is a very precise passage 
that astounds both Protestants and Catholics alike. It was written in 1849 in line 
with the fervor of anti-Climacus, which already sketches the first consistent cri-
tiques of Bishop Mynster and Professor Martensen. The style is dry and aphoristic:
32  Papirer I A 108 / KJN Papir 74. In this context, Kierkegaard raises, in light of the the-
ology course that Clausen and Martensen taught at the university, the objection about the 
“Church-Bible circle”: what must be believed about the church on the basis of the Bible and 
what must be believed about the inspiration of the Bible on the authority of the church. For 
more, see Papirer I C 19 and II C 12ff and 14 / KJN Not1: 2–8 and Not4: 3. See also J. Peters-
en, “Sören Kierkegaards bibelsyn,” Kierkegaardiana IX (1974), 31ff.
33  Papirer II A 117 / KJN DD:27. —Translator’s note: Fabro’s rendering of this passage 
above differs slightly from that of Alastair Hannay, who renders the text in KJN: “the inex-
pressible need to pray for oneself [til at bide for sig], which the unhappy dead seek to satisfy 
[søge tilfredsst] through the living (the ecclesiastical doctrine of requiem for the dead [det kirkelige 
Dogme om Sjælemesse for Afdøde]” (KJN DD:27, emphasis mine). Fabro’s rendering attempts to 
capture the ecclesiological resonance of Kierkegaard’s remark whereas Hannay’s render-
ing invites a more cynical or facetious view of prayer for the dead. It is worth noting Martin
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“The Church” fundamentally must represent “Becoming,” whereas the “State” 
instead represents “the Established.” For this reason, it is very dangerous when 
Church and State grow together and become identical. For the State, the 
principle is valid: “Even if one of its institutions were problematic, inasmuch 
as it is the established order, one must be very cautious about eliminating it, 
precisely because the State essentially is part of the idea of ‘the Established.” 
It becomes perhaps more useful to keep up an unsatisfactory “established 
order” than to reform it too hastily. For “the Church,” the exact opposite 
is the case, since its idea consists in its coming to be. “Becoming” is more 
spiritual than “being established.” The ministers of the Church then must 
not be civil servants or functionaries; probably not even married, since they 
must be the ones who expedite, those who make all the necessary arrangements 
to be at the service of “coming to be.”34
The connection between church and state has brought about the degeneration of 
triumphalism in Christianity. Kierkegaard distinguishes between the static church 
of established Christendom (the “state churches,” the “people’s churches,” the 
“Christian nations”) and the church emerging in the New Testament, which remains 
central to the opposition between the church militant and the church triumphant. 
In fact, Christ said of himself that “I am the way, the truth and the life” (Jn 14:6). 
For this reason, Kierkegaard declares that from the Christian perspective, “the 
truth naturally consists not in knowing the truth, but in being the truth. Despite 
all modern philosophy there is on this point an infinite difference” (Practice in 
Luther’s separation of purgatory from prayer for the dead: “I regard it as no sin to pray . . . 
‘Dear God, if this soul is in a condition accessible to mercy, be thou gracious to it.’ And when 
this has been done once or twice, let it suffice. For vigils and requiem masses and yearly cele-
brations of requiems are useless.” Luther’s Works, Volume 37: Word and Sacrament III, ed. Robert 
Fischer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1976), 369.
34  Papirer X1 A 552 / KJN NB 12:13. In the brief paragraph dedicated to the church in 
the Postscript (Pt. 1, sec. 2, 34ff) Kierkegaard limits himself to criticize the conception of 
the state church or the “people’s church” as if it were superior to the Bible. However even 
Kierkegaard experienced for a time when he was younger a crisis of faith, searching to live 
according to the dominate (Hegelian) philosophy that then would appear in contrast with 
Christianity. It refers to a kind of “leap” [Springet], but not in a religious and Christian sense 
of the passage to faith—as discussed in the pseudonymous writings—but in terms of the 
abandonment of Christianity, while always preserving a respect toward Christianity: “On the 
contrary, it was a leap away from Christianity. As a child who had lived his religious life under 
the impression of Christianity and received his education from it. Søren Kierkegaard later 
stated that even during this time of apostasy, he had never given up his relationship to, or 
his reverence for Christianity.” Troels-Lund, Bakkehus og Solbjerg: Traek af et nyt Livssyns Ud-
vikling i Norden, Bd. III (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1922), 145. In light of this last observation, 
Kierkegaard energetically declared himself in favor of celibacy. For more, see Papirer VIII1 A 
54; X3 A 419 / KJN NB:165 and NB 20:157.
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Christianity, 205). Therefore, the truth is not a product or a result of history. In 
complete agreement with St. Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities, taken up also 
by the young Newman, Kierkegaard concludes: 
If one maintains the affirmation of Christ himself, that the truth is the way, it will 
always be more evident that a Church triumphant in this world is an illusion: 
here one may speak only of a militant Church. But the Church militant relates 
itself, feels itself drawn, to Christ in his self-abasement; the Church triumphant 
takes Christ in vain. The aim of this writing here is to show with full clarity so 
it will be remembered that the Church triumphant always means a Church 
that wants to triumph in this world; because a Church triumphant in eternity 
always has its place insofar as it corresponds to the entrance of Christ in glory.35
There is then in Kierkegaard’s conception of Christianity a very precise Catholic 
need—which is not possible to develop more in detail here—for the church: 
that is, for the church as it is presented in the New Testament, militantly helping, 
and pushing the single individual to imitate the model instead of the world. If 
Kierkegaard has reprimanded Catholicism for being a “state church” (which no 
longer exists!), then he has denounced—accusing it of “apostasy”—the Protestant 
“state church” as well. This polemic resumes in 1851 right after the publication of 
Practice in Christianity, in reply to some publications about Protestant ecclesiology 
inspired by theological liberalism. Kierkegaard’s interest was sparked by reading 
the work of Richard Rothe on the history and constitution of the church entitled, 
The Origins of the Christian Church and its Constitution (1837).36 Referring to this text 
35  Søren Kierkegaard, Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Practice in Christianity (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 209, trans. amended. For more, see the texts from 
that period in Papirer X3 A 415–16 / KJN NB 20:154. With the publication of Practice in 
Christianity (1850), Kierkegaard broke away from established Christendom and opted for 
the “church militant” [stridende Kirke], which is the church of the martyrs and the witnesses 
to the truth. This was not a conclusion provoked by melancholy, but rather—as one scholar 
acutely has observed—from the profound aspiration that had shook and empowered him 
since childhood alongside his father: “During this powerfully moving time, upon which he 
reflects in the deepest and most original way, where all the past memories flood back to the 
surface, he often returns to the impression, given to him by his Father about the Passion 
narrative: ‘It always lingers in my mind that they spat upon Christ’ [mig svaever det bestandigt 
for øje, at der blev spyttet paa Kristus]. The resentment of the world that lived in him as a 
child, awakens within him, he feels alone in this hostile world, he sees all the holy witnesses 
of the truth stretching their hands toward him and he longs to suffer for the Truth as the 
most intimate form of communion with them and the Savior.” Hans Sofus Vodskov, Spredte 
Studier (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1884), 11–12. The problem of Kierkegaard’s “catholic ten-
dencies” is already recognized by Brandes and Høffding and requires further independent 
treatment. For more, see Cornelio Fabro, “Spunti Cattolici Nel Pensiero Religioso Di Søren 
Kierkegaard,” Doctor Communis 26, no. 4 (1973): 251–80.
36  Papirer 1851, X4 A 226 / KJN NB 23:216.
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with precision, Kierkegaard observes: “Richard Rothe straightforwardly deduces 
the idea of the Church from human nature. It is supposedly inherent in sociality, 
which is a part of human nature” (KJN NB 21:216 [1851]). One can also observe 
that Rothe treats this doctrine again in his famous Theological Ethics, when referring 
to our moral obligations toward the church.37 He says that “the ecclesiastical stage 
of the historical development of Christianity has past and now the Christian spirit 
has entered into its ethical stage as politics” (§1168, 397). Rothe argues for, using a 
buzzword from post-conciliar theology, the complete “secularization” of the church: 
But Christianity, according to its inner essence, wants to go beyond the Church, 
it wants nothing less than the entire organism of human life in general for its 
organism—that is, the State. It is of essential importance then that it becomes 
more completely secularized [verweltlichen], that it throws off the ecclesiastical 
form it had to adorn upon entering the world, to undress and put on what 
is common to all humankind [die allgemeinmenschliche], the ethical form of 
life in itself. (§1168, 397)
For Rothe, this is the point of arrival for the historical development of Christianity, 
which reveals the originality of the Reformation: “The decisive turning point where 
Christianity breaks through its ecclesiastical-historical period and moves into its 
political-historical stage is the Reformation. With the Reformation, Christianity 
itself removed [aufgehoben] the Church in principle” (398).38 
Rothe’s assertions are made in complete agreement with Fichte (in his 
work about the French Revolution) when he says, “it was the Reformation that 
has negated the Church itself.” In fact, Rothe quotes from Fichte’s The System of 
Ethics: “The Protestant communities are either highly inconsistent or they must 
not pretend to be Churches at all” (398). Again, Rothe quotes from Fichte: 
Hence the church is not a particular community, as has often been argued, 
but is merely a particular way of looking at the same single human society 
at large. Everyone belongs to the church to the extent that they have the 
correct, moral way of thinking, and everyone ought to belong to it. 39
37  Richard Rothe, Theologische Ethik, 2nd ed. (Wittenberg: H. Roelling, 1871), Bd. 5, 397–416, 
§1168. Rothe returned to the problem of the church also in his posthumous Dogmatik, ed. D. 
Schenkel (Heidelberg: Mohr, 1870) P. II, 2: Das Bewußtsein der Gnade, 1ff. See also, Stille Stunden 
(Wittenberg: Koelling, 1872), 317ff & passim. All translations are my own unless otherwise cited.
38  This observation appears also in Kierkegaard, in a different context, the previous year: 
“Richard Rothe (Anfänge der christlichen Kirche) lets the Church get absorbed into the State 
and thinks it perfectly logical that the theatre (As in paganism) will become the worship of 
God.” Papirer 1850, X3 A 561 / KJN NB 21:119.
39  J. G. Fichte, Das System der Sittenlehre, §30, SW IV, 348; ET: Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Daniel 
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Recalling Schleiermacher’s observation in his Christian Ethics that “no one has yet 
been able to express the contrast between Catholic and Lutheran positions in a 
determinate formula” (Die christliche Sitte, 572 and 576), Rothe says: 
Basically this contrast stems from the fact that Catholicism thinks about Chris-
tianity essentially in terms of the Church, as absolute piety as such; whereas 
for Protestantism, Christianity is not the Church, but rather a religiously 
inspired morality [Sittlichkeit].40 
Fundamentally, Rothe offers a deistic, secular, and masonic conception here. 
Moreover, Rothe’s description perpetuates this opposition and difference further 
by accentuating the growing carelessness that Protestantism has shown for the 
church as either a “theologoumenon” or an institution.
Kierkegaard radically contests Rothe’s secularization of the church as a 
deduction made “too hastily.” Above all, it is important to note Kierkegaard’s 
principled position against Rothe’s basic thesis when Kierkegaard declares: “I do 
not intend to deny the reality of the Church, or the fact that Christianity argues 
for it” (NB 23:216). Two main observations follow that indicate the positive and 
negative aspects (or the limit) of Kierkegaard’s position, which is dominated by 
the emergence and primacy of the single individual. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s 
two reservations come in a diametrically opposed way to Rothe’s position: 
a) In fact, Christianity is related to spirit, whereas sociality refers instead to 
the mind-body synthesis of the human being. Aristotle rightly says that “the 
crowd” is an animal category. And Christianity teaches that eternal life is 
simply not social.
b) From “spirit” one cannot deduce a society, and the Church fundamentally 
exists then precisely because we are not truly or purely spirit. The “commu-
nity” is an accommodation, an indulgence considering how little we are—or 
could endure being—spirit.41 
Breazeale, and Günter Zöller, The System of Ethics: According to the Principles of the Wissenschaft-
slehre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 329. However, Fichte already had 
mentioned the incoherence of the Protestant communities and the presence of the Catho-
lic Church in Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische Revolution 
(1793), Werke VII, eds. H. Schulz and R. Strecker (Leipzig, 1919), 214ff. 
40  “Im Wesentlichen beruht dieser Gegensatz darin, daß der Katholicismus das Christenthum 
wesentlich als Kirche, als Frömmigkeit lediglich als solche denkt, der Protestantismus nicht als 
Kirche, sondern als religiös beseelte Sittlichkeit.” Rothe, Theologische Ethik Bd. 5, 399n1.
41  Papirer 1851, X4 A 226 / KJN NB 23:216.
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For Kierkegaard, even the category of “spirit” is opposed to the Hegelian notion 
of Geist, and this indicates the single individual’s absolute freedom in and for her 
relationship to God.
In this way, Kierkegaard does not deny the church. We have seen the defense 
of the “church militant” by Anti-Climacus and now he takes the opportunity from 
the alleged protest to contrast “the Law (and) the Gospel,” according to the title 
of a text that takes a position against another contemporary German theologian 
and definitively against the Reformation. Even if the text does not speak about 
the church explicitly, the opposition between Protestantism and Catholicism is 
interesting, and it more explicitly refers to the opposition between naturalism 
and supernaturalism that Rothe mentioned. Kierkegaard resolutely rejects the 
classical thesis of Protestant historiography:  
Christianity is the Gospel—I agree, but Christ says that he did not come to 
abolish the Law, but to fulfill it (Mt 4:17), to make the Law more rigorous, 
as in the Sermon on the Mount. If care is not taken in this respect, then the 
Gospel, grace, is taken in vain. [And now Kierkegaard’s critique of Luther] 
Later, the Reformation comes along. It has been said that it emphasized 
“grace” at the expense of the Law.42 Fine. But perhaps Luther was not attentive 
enough here. The norm is: For every additional degree of grace, the Law 
must also be made more rigorous in its interiority—otherwise all worldliness 
goes wild and takes “grace” in vain. And this is precisely what happened with 
the Reformation.43 
Kierkegaard’s position seems to veer toward Calvin when he says, “the Church 
exists only for the sake of our imperfections” but Petersen, the sensible theologian, 
does not agree: “Naturally!,”44 as Kierkegaard ironically observes.
42  Here Kierkegaard cites from August Petersen, Die Idee Der Christlichen Kirche, vol. 3 
(Leipzig: Vogel, 1842), 345n. Petersen refers to an expression by Karl Ullmann: “The Ref-
ormation is . . . the reaction of Christianity as Gospel against Christianity as Law.” Karl Ull-
mann, Reformatoren Vor Der Reformation: Vornehmlich in Deutschland Und Den Niederlanden, vol. 
1 (Hamburg: 1841), xiii. In the following passage entitled “Ridiculous!,” Kierkegaard writes: 
“I’m reading Petersen’s The Idea of the Church. It is a very well written book. But I cannot help 
laughing when reading such things. Here is a theologian who pontificates and blabbers on 
about the future of the entire Church [. . . but in reality] his life always follows the same 
tune [Melodie]: the search for privilege and honors . . . And this is how it goes today: sheer 
debauchery in doctrine, fantasy, observations, insight, etc.—but without any traction (or) 
thought, no sense of action.” Papirer 1851 X4 A 231 / KJN NB 23:221. 
43  Papirer 1851, X4 A 230 / KJN NB 23:220.
44  Papirer 1851, X4 A 233 / KJN NB 23:223. The work by Petersen is found in Kierkegaard’s 
own library. For more see, Niels Thulstrup, Katalog over Søren Kierkegaard Bibliotek (Copenha-
gen 1927), nn. 717–19, 57.
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In this evaluation, Rothe and Kierkegaard chase after one other and they 
evoke the shared source of Petersen: the determination of “Christian consciousness” 
[christliches Bewußtsein], one of the key concepts of neo-Protestantism, put in circu-
lation by Schleiermacher. For Rothe, the opposition between Protestantism and 
Catholicism is that the latter intends “piety,” [Frömmigkeit] or the proper relation 
toward God essentially as church, whereas the former unravels the ecclesiastical 
fabric and dissolves it into the ethical [Sittlichkeit] animated by religion.45 This is 
the meaning and function of “Christian consciousness”: to liberate the believer 
from adhering to “dogmas,” from believing the “determinates” of defined dogmas 
and propositions asserted by the church. 
More precisely, “Christian consciousness” expresses the historical conditions of 
the interaction between a particular consciousness and that of the community—but 
Rothe does not explain the equivalence of Schleiermacher’s formula with that of his 
adversary Hegel. Rothe makes his point with reference to faith in Christ: “Certainly, 
faith in Christ must be restored vigorously, but not as faith in an ecclesiastical dogma 
about him but rather as believing Christian consciousness.”46 The realization of this 
Christian consciousness is then distilled from consciousness itself and thus from 
the interaction between the believer and the world. However, any reference to the 
preservation and transmission of divine revelation disappears, to which belongs, 
according to the Catholic idea, the authority of the church.47 For this reason, in 
Protestantism, the dissolution of dogmatic faith goes hand in hand with the dissolu-
tion of the church. From this perspective, the following main points can be made:
1. Christian consciousness is the historical consciousness of the Christian world: This 
Christian consciousness is in fact nothing other than [nota bene] the natural de-
termination of self-consciousness, whether an individually or commonly shared 
awareness, as it has been found immediately in itself either by the individual 
or by the community in the Christian world under the continuous influences 
of Christianity . . . the natural human feeling and the naturally “sound human 
understanding” of people who grew up on Christian soil. Essentially, it is what 
is presented under the name of “natural religion” (408–409).48 
45  In support of this ecclesial disengagement, Rothe cites from Petersen, The Idea of the 
Church, III: 200f and combines it with Schleiermacher’s view in his Christian Ethics: “Luther 
loves to substitute ‘Christendom’ for the expression ‘the Church”’; whereas “Catholicism 
knows no other form of Christianity than the Church.” Theologische Ethik, Bd. 5, 399.
46  Rothe, Theologische Ethik, §1168, Bd. 5, 408.
47  On 408n2, Rothe appeals to the new synthetic method with a positivistic background, 
already active mid-century, that represents a convergence between science and religion in 
which “the many-branched, comprehensive total knowledge with religious conviction pen-
etrates itself and melds together a systematically harmonious worldview.” H. M. Chalybäus, 
System der speculativen Ethik, §239, Der Heilsprocess (Leipzig 1850) Bd. 2, 425.
48  Rothe says that it is called “religiousism” [Religiosismus] by theologians like F. Nitzsch 
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In this way, liberal subjectivism dissolved faith into the religion of reason, which 
had expulsed it already from the beginning. 
2. Natural religion is the organ of Christian consciousness: This natural religion 
is then the consciousness of an historically Christianized humanity that imme-
diately finds in itself the essential religious ideas of Christianity independently 
from the dogmatic tradition of the Church—the Christian consciousness as 
it is known naturally in the Christian world, does not come especially from 
outside or from an exterior authority (409).
The logical consequence of this “dissolution process” [Auflösungsprozeß], as Rothe 
candidly refers to it, leads to
3. The elimination of the Church: There is now this new fact—which of course 
completely conforms to the nature of things—a fact that has never happened 
before, that the dissolving development of a certain form of the Christian 
Church does not bring about a new form of the Church (410–11).
Rothe claims that this is the case at least in Germany. Here Rothe polemically 
criticizes F. Nitzsch for whom the church was “the specific and exclusive organ 
of Christianity or rather the activity of Christ (through the Holy Spirit) in the 
world” (414). Rothe observes that this was valid for earlier times when the state 
was not Christian: “Certainly, one must admit that even today the Church is an 
indispensable organ of Christ’s activity [Wirksamkeit], but it is no longer the only 
one and it is no more efficacious [wirksame] than others.”49 
This was the theological and spiritual climate of Protestantism in Kierkegaard’s 
time, which pushed ideas like the “purely human” and identified Christianity with “a 
volatilized Christianity, a cultural consciousness that Christianity has emitted. Thus, 
it is produced by Christianity—and then it came into opposition with Christianity.”50 
It takes out the water and throws away the fountain: this is Kierkegaard’s critique.
Moreover, Kierkegaard’s critique denounces the “dissolution process” of the 
church in Protestant Christianity as bad faith. Indeed, the concept of “Christian 
consciousness” as it is developed by Rothe in the wake of Schleiermacher and 
Neander, is an expression that Kierkegaard critically turns on its head:
and A. Petersen, in Schleiermacher’s school of thought.
49  Rothe, op. cit., Bd. V, 415–16. For this reason, he observed that the concepts of “church” 
and “Body of Christ” are not identical (413n1). Rothe concludes his treatment of the 
Church with the problem of the relation between the Catholic Church and the unity of the 
churches (§1177ff., 471ff). 
50  Papirer 1851, X4 A 235 / KJN NB 23:225.
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1. A critique of the expression: “The Christian Consciousness” [Das christliche 
Bewußtseyn]: The expression comes from Schleiermacher, and Neander, 
praising it, explains that the Reformation was a gesture of this “Christian 
consciousness” . . . but the matter has something very dubious about it. 
Namely, that Christianity ideally relates itself to the single individual.51
2. Protestant “Christian consciousness” is a residue, an emission of faith: On 
the other hand, when the price of being a Christian is sharply reduced, when 
all kinds of illusions are tolerated to keep up the appearance that everyone 
is a Christian—entire countries and States . . . then a residue of Christianity 
is formed (a “generic” or “common consciousness”). But if this is meant to 
be Christianity, no thanks!
3. “Christian consciousness” will become “consciousness of culture”: In this 
way, the world will probably also emit a new “cultural consciousness,” a res-
idue of Christianity—also a new Christian consciousness that probably will 
make natural science its religion.
4. “Christian consciousness” is the sign of Christianity’s disappearance: You 
see, the great thing is that this Christian consciousness, which in the end falls 
away from Christianity will become “Christian consciousness,” and we will 
have a Christian consciousness for the whole world at the same time—and 
at precisely the same time—when Christianity will no longer exist at all.52
This is a discussion that can be described as undoubtedly prophetic for us today 
who witness in post-conciliar theology the spreading of theological pluralism and 
ecclesial ecumenism that intends to entrust to the “human sciences,” immersed 
in contingency, the salvific message of the crucified.
Kierkegaard resists neo-Protestantism (and Protestantism in general) when 
they lack the criterion of Christian authenticity: the imitation of Christ and the 
saints. It is only in this way that the church is and can be the “communion of saints.”53
51  Schleiermacher seems to use interchangeably the expressions: “Christian conscious-
ness” [das christliche Bewußtsein] and “self-consciousness” [Selbstbewußtsein] in Die christliche 
Sitt (Berlin 1884), 24.
52  Papirer 1851, X4 A 232 / KJN NB 23:222.
53  For more, see Papirer 1851, X4 A 246 / KJN NB 24:7.
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CONCLUSION: THE CHRISTIAN ALTERNATIVE 
IN NEWMAN AND KIERKEGAARD
Like Dostoevsky and Solovyov in the Russian Church, so Newman and Ki-
erkegaard in Protestantism have warned us, in a prophetic way, about the gradual 
and inevitable erosion of the Christian message of salvation brought on by Prot-
estantism and modern thought. The legend of the Grand Inquisitor recited by 
Ivan Karamazov is at once an attack and a defense. It is an attack on the human 
deviations of the church and a defense of its explicitly spiritual mission. It is in 
this same context that the attacks by Newman against the Establishment and those 
by Kierkegaard against established Christendom should be read—in the context of 
the radical existential resolution that connects thought and life and links the 
contemporary church with the ancient church.54
As existential thinkers, Newman and Kierkegaard sought the truth by way 
of antithesis and they formulate it in terms of an alternative: either Catholicism 
or atheism (Newman), either Christianity or Paganism (Kierkegaard).55 This al-
ternative takes on a more universal and radical significance when Christianity in 
Christendom gets accommodated (updated!) to the world. In fact, Christendom 
“is so far from being a community of Christians that it expresses instead, as I have 
shown elsewhere, apostasy from Christianity.”56 I say this because “in Christendom, 
Christianity is situated as intellectualism”—a form of highway robbery according 
to Kierkegaard—and it is the equivalent of collusion with the kind of liberalism 
that Newman had rejected not only in Anglican Protestantism but also in the 
politicized ranks of Anglo-Catholicism.57
54  In this sense, a German Oratorian once observed that “the always necessary renewal of 
the Church must proceed from the ‘original church’ of the Fathers era [der “ursprünglichen 
Kirche” der Väterzeit] . . . Newman, in a unique stroke of genius, has associated the theology 
of existence with the theology of objective mediation by connecting them to the Church.” 
Werner Becker, “Newman,” in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Bd. 7 (1962), 935, 932–36.
55  It is surprising that Romano Guardini sees Kierkegaard’s work (and also Dostoyevsky’s 
Legend of the Grand Inquisitor) as “fighting against the Church” [gegen di Kirche kämpfenden], 
in Christliches Bewußtsein: versuche über Pascal (Leipzig 1934), 20. Guardini never bothered to 
conduct a comparative study of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, his Journals, or Practice in Chris-
tianity. What is even more surprising is the critique of Newman’s “alternative” by Gottlieb 
Söhngen in Kardinal Newman: sein Gottesgedanke und seine Denkergestalt (Bonn 1946), 46ff.
56  Papirer 1854, XI2 A 100 / KJN NB 33:26. Translator’s note: Kierkegaard actually uses the 
Danish word for rubbish or waste [Affaldet] but Fabro translates it using the Italian word apostasia.
57  For editorial purposes, the documentation of the original sources mentioned in this ver-
sion of the article cites only what is essential. Earlier versions of this article were published 
in C. Fabro, “Il problema della Chiesa in Newman e Kierkegaard,” in Ecclesia Mater 12, no. 2 
(1976): 85–95; and C. Fabro, “La problème de I’Église chez Newman et Kierkegaard,” Revue 
Thomiste no. 1 (1977): 30–90. 
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